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”The constitution of a people must be in relation to the type of life and the 
intimate structure of that nation.”
2 
 
ABSTRACT: When the concept of “supremacy of the Constitution” appeared, 
it also brought into discussion its protection. Thus, slowly but surely, different 
means of protecting the Constitution and its supremacy took shape, including 
the control of constitutionality. The purpose of the constitutionality control – the 
protection  of  the  constitution  –  is  fully  achieved  only  when  the  cases  the 
restriction  of  the  fundamental  law  circumscribe  to  the  control.  The  modern 
Romanian constitutional system established also the control of constitutionality 
of the initiatives for revision of the constitution forwarded to the Constitution’s 
“guardian”  –  the  Constitutional  Court  of  Romania.  This  paper  features  a 
review of key aspects regarding the exercise of constitutional control initiatives 
to revise the Constitution such as: the competent authority and the foundation of 
that power, the notification procedure, the procedure of exercising the control 
for that mater, the solutions of the Constitutional Court and a summary of the 
practice of the Constitutional Court of Romania in this field. 
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1. THE LEGAL HEADQUARTERS. COMPETENT AUTHORITY 
 
The high degree of stability, specific to a written constitution contributes to the 
affirmation of the principles of the rule of law. To ensure the stability of the Constitution, 
the authorities appealed to “the constitutional rigidity” which implies a special set of tools 
and processes of change (revision) of the Constitution. 
Issues that are considered methods of achieving constitutional rigidity:  
1.  The  establishment  of  certain  special  conditions  necessary  for  exercising  the 
initiative  of  revising  the  Constitution  and  the  draft  or  the  revision  proposal  of  the 
Constitution are officially subject to the constitutional control of the Constitutional Court, 
according to Article 146 letter a of the Constitution; 
 2. Establishing the competent body to adopt the law of revision and its debate 
procedure
3;  
3. Incumbency for subjecting law for revision to the referendum; 4. The call for 
certain constitutional provisions declared unrevisable
4. 
Constitutional rigidity should not become a purpose in itself but should represent a 
guarantee of the constitutional stability
5. 
The initiatives of revising the fundamental law of the state are also subject to the 
constitutional control in the modern Romanian constitutional system.  
The practicing of constitutional control on the initiatives to revise the Constitution 
is regulated by Article 146 letter a, the last part from the Romanian Constitution and by 
the Law  no. 47/1992  regarding the organization and functioning of the Constitutional 
Court republished
6. 
The Constitutional Court of Romania is the only competent authority to rule on the 
constitutionality of the initiatives for revising the Constitution. It is a control exercised 
                                                 
3 In our constitutional system, the competent body to pass a law of revision (constitutional law) is still the 
Parliament  but  the  procedure  of  adopting  a  law  of  this  kind presents  some  special  aspects  concerning  the 
ordinary legislative procedure. 
4 According to Article 151 paragraph 1 of the revised Romanian Constitution, the following provisions cannot be 
the subject of a revision: the national, independent, unitary and indivisible feature of the state (provided by 
Article 1 paragraph 1 from the revised Constitution); the Republican form of government (provided by Article 1 
paragraph 2 from the revised Constitution); the territorial integrity (provided by Article 3 paragraph 1 from the 
revised Constitution); independence of the judiciary (provided by Article 124 paragraph 3 from the revised 
Constitution); political pluralism (provided by Article 13 paragraph 3, Article 8 paragraph 1  from the revised 
Romanian Constitution); official language (provided by Article 13 from the revised Constitution). Also, the 
Romanian Constitution controls other necessary conditions necessary for  constitutional revision: the revision 
cannot suppress fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens or their guarantees (Article 152 paragraph 2 from 
the revised Constitution); the Constitution cannot be revised during a state of siege, the state of emergency or in 
wartime (Article 152 paragraph 3 of the revised Constitution) and in the case of extending the Parliamentary 
mandate in accordance with Article 63 of the Constitution. 
5 See Mihai Constantinescu, Antonie Iorgovan, Ioan Muraru, Elena Simina Tănăsescu “Constituţia României 
revizuită – comentarii şi explicaţii”, All Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, p. 337. 
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only in advance and only publicly appointed
7 and consists in the “verification of their 
consistency with the Article 148 of the Basic Law (Article 152 after the revision), with the 
international treaties and the rules of the procedure of law making”
8 
The  exercise  of  the  constitutional  control  on  the  initiatives  to  revise  the 
Constitution according to Article 146 letter a the last part, of the Constitution is made in 
two stages.  
Thus,  according  to  Article  19  of  Law  no.  47/1992  republished,  prior  the 
notification  of  the  Parliament  to  initiate  the  legislative  procedure  of  revising  the 
Constitution,  the  bill  or  the  legislative  proposal
9, accompanied by the  advice  of the 
Legislative Council, shall be submitted to the Constitutional Court  which is bound within 
10 days to compl y  with the rules related to the  constitutional revision. Subsequently, 
according to Article 23 paragraph 1 of Law no. 47/1992 republished,  the Constitutional 
Court shall decide ex officio on adopting the law of revision of the Constitution  within 5 
days. Therefore it is a double-control
10. 
The fact that the law  for revision is subject to a foregoing  control  only  (even 
double) (always exercised  before the entry into force of the law   for revision - by its 
approval in the referendum) is justified on the basis of national sovereignty, which 
belongs to the people.  
Thus, the  ratification of the  Constitution or  its amendments by referendum  is a 
means of exercising this sovereignty. Once people expressed such willingness, no one 
could interfere, as the Court determined through a decision: “In general, when people, the 
owner of the national sovereignty is called to decide by referendum on the law of revision 
of  the  Constitution,  and  the  moment  the  Parliament  passed  that  certain  law  with  the 
procedure  and  limits  set  by  the  Constituent,  no  public  authority  can  decide  upon  it 
anymore. This explains the fact that the  contencious  constitutional court,  within an a 
priori control, decides ex officio only upon the initiatives of revising the Constitution.”
11 
                                                 
7 It was stated that an a posteriori control or perception through a plea of unconstitutionality to the law of 
revision would be necessary and usefull; for details see Ion Deleanu, Revizuirea Constituţiei, article in the 
Review „Dreptul”, no. 12/2003, p. 6 (footnote no. 6). 
8 See Mihai Constantinescu, Ioan Vida, Revizuirea Constituţiei, article in the Review „Dreptul” no. 12/2003, p. 
6 (footnote no. 6). 
9 The foundation of the distinction between bills and legislative proposals is set by  the categories of initiators. 
The president of Romania, proposed by the Government will inform the Parliament through the bills, and the 
lawmakers and citizens’ initiatives will take the form of legislative proposals. But the distinction has no legal 
significance - see Tudor Drăganu, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice – tratat elementar, vol. II, p. 109. 
10 In the specialty literature we find that „...under the current constitutional regulations (the revised Constitution 
– A/N), ex post facto, after the adoption of the law of revision, but before the referendum, it is not possible ...“- 
Ion  Deleanu,  Instituţii  şi  proceduri  constituţionale  -  în  dreptul  comparat  şi  în  dreptul  român,  Servo-Sat 
Publishing House, Arad, 2003, p. 706 (footnote no. 1). We believe that such a control cannot be considered a 
posteriori, but must be considered an a priori one (exercised before the entry into force of the law, even after its 
adoption by Parliament), as well as in the case of ordinary and organic laws adopted by the Romanian Parliament 
and subject to the previous control according to Article 146 letter a the first part of the revised Constitution. 
11 See the Decision of the Constitutional Court no. 356 of 23 September 2003, published in the Official Gazette 
of Romania no. 686 of 30 September 2003. By this Decision, the Constitutional Court rejected an intimation 
regarding the law of revision of the Constitution, outcome that must be considered correct related to the legal 
constitutional provisions in force at that time (23 September 2003). But later, the law no. 47/1992 was amended 
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The fact that it is a control exercised only ex officio excludes any possibility that 
the constitutional court to be notified by anyone else (other public authorities, individuals 
or  legal  entities).  We  believe  that  this  procedure  is  based  on  the  quality  of  the 
Constitutional Court as guarantor of the  supremacy of Constitution. Considering these 
qualities,  we  must  take  into  consideration  the  fact  that  the  initiative  of  Constitutional 
Court is obligatory (obligation provided by Article 19 of Law no. 47/1992 republished). 
The control made by the Court is a systematic control (a single case
12), a priori and 
abstract. 
 
2. THE PROCEDURE OF NOTIFYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
Before informing the Parliament for the initiation of the legislative procedure of 
revising the Constitution, the bill or the legislative proposal, along with the advice of the 
Legislative Council, shall be submitted to the Constitutional Court which is bound, within 
10 days, to decide upon the compliance with the constitutional stipulations regarding the 
revision (Article 19 of Law no. 47/1992 republished). 
The bill or the proposed revision of the Constitution shall be filed only in the form 
required by law, elaborated and drafted according to the rules of legislative technique 
required
13, and accompanied by the advice of the Legislative Council. In connection with 
this advice, it is clear that it  must be demanded and obtained mandatory (since  it must 
accompany the bill or the proposal of revision), but the question is whether this is an 
advisory opinion or assent?  
Since  the  Constitution or  the  Law  no.  47/1992 republished  does  not  mention 
anything, they find their applicability in the provisions of Law no. 24/2000 republished, 
according to which the advice of the Legislative Council is an advisory opinion (Article 9 
paragraph 3). Nor could we speak about another solution, since the Constitutional Court 
acts as the only authority of competent constitutional jurisdiction.  
An eventual assent of the Legislative Council – respectively an obligatory assent 
for the authority that asked for it – especially if it is also negative, could end prematurely 
the procedures of the constitutional control before the constitutional jurisdiction has the 
opportunity to exercise its prerogatives. 
 
  3. PROCEDURE  OF  EXERCISING  THE  CONTROL REGARDING  THE 
INITIATIVES FOR REVISING THE CONSTITUTION 
 
Upon  receiving  the  bill  or  the  legislative  proposal,  the  President  of  the 
Constitutional Court shall appoint a judge-rapporteur and shall set the hearing. 
                                                 
12 See  Ioan Muraru, Mihai Constantinescu,  Curtea Constituţională a României, Albatros Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 1997, p. 150; Ioan Muraru, Nasty Marian Vlădoiu, Andrei Muraru, Silviu-Gabriel Barbu, Contencios 
constituţional, Hamangiu Pubishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p. 223. 
13 Through the Law no. 24 of 27 March 2000 regarding the legislative technique norms for the drafting of the 
normative acts, published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 139 of 31 March 2000, republished in the 









CURENTUL JURIDIC                                                                                                     95                                                                
The  document  which  actually  launches  the  legal  conclusion  is  in  fact  the 
conclusion by which the Plenary Court decides its notification ex officio (according to 
Article 16 paragraph 3 from the Rules of Court), the starting moment of the period of 10 
days when the Constitutional Court must decide
14. 
The activities prior to the hearing, those preceding the debates and those related to 
the  debate,  deliberation  and  solution ,  take  place,  in  principle,  after  the  same  rules 
established  by  the  Regulations  of  the  Chamber,  as  in  the  exercise  of  the  previous 
constitutional control of  laws before promulgation
15. There are though two differences. 
1. The first is relat ed to the deadline for submission of  the report of the  judge-
rapporteur, which must be much shorter, taking into account the fact that the Court itself 
is bound to rule within 10 days of submission of the bill or legislative proposal.  We find 
here  the application of  Article 49 from the  Regulation of the Constitutional Court, 
according to which, if urgency requires, the President of the Constitutional Court may 
decide,  after  consultation  with  the  judge -rapporteur,  the  shortening  of  the  terms . 
Regarding the period of 10 days in which the Constitutional Court is bound to rule on the 
initiatives for revising the Constitution, the specialty literature states that it wouldn’t be 
the best one, as it is not a period of decay, “being a term of constitutional procedure” and 
anyway,  even  if  exceeded,  one  couldn’t  continue  with  the  legislative  procedure  for 
adoption the revision law, because the Parliament is bound to await the decision of the 
Court, while the Article 22 of the Law no. 47/1992 republished determines that the bill or 
the legislative proposal is presented to Parliament only together with the decision of the 
Constitutional Court
16. The period of 10 days was considered by other authors as a period 
of constitutional procedure and not a civil procedure
17. 
2. The second difference is related to the necessary majority for adopting the Court 
decision in this case. According to  the Article 22 of Law no. 47/1992 republished, the 
Constitutional Court rules on the bill or legislative proposal by a vote of two thirds of t he 
judges (being taken into account the total number of members, respectively the plenum of 
the Court
18). It is noted that a qualified majority , greater than that  necessary for taking 
decisions regarding the other duties of constitutional control and, as noted in doctrine, it is 
equal to the  required majority to adopt the law  of revision by parliamentary  chambers, 
“fully justified by the supreme importance of the initiative, challenging and bringing into 
discussion  its  fundamental  structure  of  the  country”
19  and  obviously,  the  role  of  the 
Constitutional Court in this regard. 
In  the  context  of  control,  the  Constitutional  Court  is  qualified  to  review  the 
procedural  requirements  imposed  by  the  Constitution,  regarding  the  exercise  of  the 
initiative to revise the Constitution (the subjects having the right to initiative regarding the 
                                                 
14 See Ioan Muraru, Mihai Constantinescu, Curtea Constituţională a României, p. 152. 
15 For details, see Daniela Valea,  Sistemul de control al constituţionalităţii din România, Universul Juridic 
Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 202-205. 
16 See Ion Deleanu, Instituţii şi proceduri constituţionale – în dreptul comparat şi în dreptul român, p. 709. 
17 See Ioan Muraru in Ioan Muraru, Elena Simina Tănăsescu (coordinators), Constituţia României. Comentariu 
pe articole, p. 1395. 
18 See Ioan Vida, Curtea Constituţională a României, The Official Gazette of Romania, Bucharest, 2011, p. 70. 









96                                                                     Daniela Cristina VALEA 
 
revision of the Constitution; the compatibility between the proposal of the President of 
Romania and the Government, in the case of the President’s initiative; the numeric criteria 
for respecting the distinction between the group members of Deputies and Senators, in the 
case of parliamentary initiative; numeric criteria or distribution of the initiator by county, 
in  the  case  of  the  popular  initiative  –  extrinsic  constitutionality)  but  also  temporal 
requirements  (the  Constitution  cannot  be  revised  during  a  state  of  siege,  the  state  of 
emergency or in time of war neither in the case of the extended Parliamentary mandate – 
also  extrinsic  constitutionality)  or  the  compliance  of  the proposed  amendments  to  the 
provisions and principles of the Constitution (intrinsic constitutionality). 
Thus, according to Article 150 of the revised Romanian Constitution, the ones who 
have  the  right  of  initiative  to  revise  the  Constitution  are  only:  the  President  on 
Government’s proposal; at least ﾼ of the number of deputies or senators, at least 500,000 
citizens entitled to vote, which must come at least ﾽ from the counties of the state and in 
Bucharest, at least 20,000 signatures. 
In our constitutional system, the competent body to pass a law of revision is the 
Parliament (which will act as the derived Constituent Assembly
20), but the procedure  of 
adopting such a law  displays some special aspects  compared to the ordinary legislative 
procedure, even if these aspects do not make the object of the constitutional control of the 
Court. Thus, the law of revision shall be adopted in the Chamber of Deputies and  in the 
Senate by a majority of at least two thirds of the members of each Chamber (qualified 
majority). In case there are differences between the texts adopted by the two Chambers, 
the law will be sent to mediation committee set up for this purpose (it is a joint committee 
comprised of the two   Chambers). If mediation  procedure  fails, the  law  for revision 
subjects to debate and vote in the joint assembly of both Parliamentary Chambers, where, 
in order to be  adopted, it needs the vote of at least three quarters of the total number of 
MPs
21. 
Instead, another aspect to be considered by the Constitutional Court refers to the  
provisions of Article 151 paragraph 1 of the revised Romanian Constitution, under which, 
the following provisions cannot be subject to revision: the national, independent, unitary 
and indivisible  feature of the state   (provided by article  1 paragraph  1 of  the revised 
Constitution) the Republican form of government (provided  by Article 1 paragraph 2 of 
the revised Constitution); territorial integrity (provided by  Article 3 paragraph 1 of the 
revised Constitution); independence of  justice (provided by  Article 124 of the  revised 
Constitution) political pluralism (provided by Article 1 paragraph 3, Article 8 paragraph 1 
of the revised Constitution), the official language (provided by  Article 13 of the revised 
Constitution). 
                                                 
20 See Ioan Vida, Curtea Constituţională a României, Monitorul Oficial Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, p. 
69. 
21 In order to be approved unappealable, the law of revision should be subject to a national referendum held for 
that purpose, within 30 days of its adoption by the Parliament. The law of revision is not subject to 
promulgation. Law revision shall be published in the Official Gazette of Romania within 5 days of its adoption 
by Parliament and after its approval by national referendum, shall be republished but only after the publication of 
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Also, the Constitutional Court must verify whether the provisions of the Article 
152 paragraph 2 and 3 of the revised Constitution are respected, according to which: the 
revision  may  not  suppress  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  of  the  citizens  or  their 
guarantees (Article 152 paragraph 2 of the revised Constitution); the Constitution cannot 
be revised during a state of siege, a state of emergency or in time of war (Article 152 
paragraph 3 of the revised Constitution) and in the case of extending the Parliamentary 
mandate in accordance with the Article 63 of the Constitution.  
The court’s decision is not only communicated to those who initiated the bill or 
legislative  proposal  or,  where  appropriate,  to  their  representative,  but  like  any  other 
decision, shall be published in the Official Gazette of Romania. 
After adopting the law of the revision by Parliament, the law is subject again, ex 
officio, to the Constitutional Court for constitutional review within 5 days of adoption. 
The provisions of the Article 20 (the appointment of a judge-rapporteur by the president 
and setting of the hearing terms) and Article 21 (the Constitutional Court pronounces on 
the bill or legislative proposal by a vote of two thirds of the judges; the Court’s decision is 
communicated to those who initiated the bill or legislative proposal or, where appropriate, 
to their representatives) of the Law no. 47/1992 republished apply accordingly. 
 
4.  THE  SOLUTIONS  OF  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  COURT.  EFFECTS 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
In the review conducted by the Constitutional Court, the first issue to be verified 
will be the extrinsic constitutionality (resulting from the compliance with the provisions of 
Article 150 of the revised Constitution - condition ratione personae, but also in Article 
152 paragraph 3 and Article 63 paragraph 4 from the revised Constitution – condition 
ratione temporis) and only subsequently, given that it is respected, the issues of intrinsic 
constitutionality shall be verified (arising from the provisions of Article 152 paragraph 1 
and 2 of the revised Constitution - condition ratione materiae, considered “hard core”
22 of 
the Constitution). 
If these conditions are not met, the Constitutional Court by decision shall declare 
the initiative of revision unconstitutional. 
Subsequently,  the  Constitutional  Court  pronounces  also  on  the  law  of  revision 
adopted  by  the  Parliament  according  to  Article  23  paragraph  1  of  Law  no.  47/1992 
republished. If the constitutional provisions regarding the procedure were not respected, 
the  Court’s  decision  would  be  sent  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  and  Senate  for  the 
reexamination of the law of revision, to implement its agreement with the Constitutional 
Court decision (Article 23 paragraph 2 Law no. 47/1992 republished). 
The  effects  produced  by  a  decision  of  the  Constitutional  Court  in  this  matter 
resulted in a series of discussions in doctrine, first taking into account the extrinsic and 
intrinsic aspects of unconstitutionality revealed and, secondly, by the fact that the decision 
issued by the Court contains a series of “recommendations” or proposals, suggestions, 
                                                 
22 See Mihai Constantinescu, Marius Amzulescu, Drept contencios constituţional, „România de mâine” – the 
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opinions. In general, it is argued that, when non-compliance of provisions that provide 
extrinsic constitutionality, the Court’s decision asserts the Parliament in the sense that, 
this cannot take into debate such a project or proposal
23.  
As  in  the case where the Court pronounces   on the  intrinsic  constitutionality, 
“determining” that certain provisions of the bill or proposed revision are unconstitutional. 
Instead, when the Court only makes a number of comments and assessments in the form 
of recommendations or suggestions, they are not binding for the Parliament
24 so that the 
real value of such a decision is the “opinion”
25. 
 
5. SUMMARY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT PRACTICE IN THIS 
MATTER 
 
From the practice, it results that the Constitutional Court was approached six times 
regarding its duty provided by Article 146 letter a the last part of the Constitution (the 
former Article 144 letter a the last part), being pronounced four decisions by which the 
Court  declared  unconstitutional  the  initiatives  (finding  a  situation  of  intrinsic 
unconstitutionality and another two extrinsic unconstitutionality), two partial admission 
decisions of the initiatives for revision of the Constitution (with some observations and 
recommendations)
26. 
Thus, by Decision  no. 85 of 3 September 1996  regarding the constitutionality of 
the  initiative  of revising  the  provisions  of  Article  41 paragraph  7 of the  Romanian 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court  ascertained the intrinsic unconstitutionality of the 
initiative (belonging to a number of 39 senators), as it would result in the suppression of 
certain guarantees of the property rights, breaching of the limits of revision provided by 
the Article 148 paragraph 2 of the Constitution
27.  
The initiative for revision proposed the replacement of the presumption on Legality 
of  acquisition  ( Article  41  paragraph  7  of  the  Constitution  from  1991provided  that 
“Legally  acquired  assets  shall  not  be  confiscated.  Legality  of  acquirement  shall  be 
presumed”) with the following text: “the legal acquirement of a wealth that cannot be 
proved shall be confiscated”.  
The  Court  grounded  its  decision,  arguing  that  “the  presumption  of  lawful 
acquisition of wealth is one of the constitutional guarantees of  the property rights, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Article 41 paragraph 1 from Constitution of 1991, 
according to which ownership is guaranteed. This assumption is based on the general 
principle that any act or legal fact is legitimate until proven otherwise, requiring, in what 
                                                 
23 See Ion Deleanu, Instituţii şi proceduri constituţionale – în dreptul comparat şi în dreptul român, p. 709-710; 
Ioan Muraru, Mihai Constantinescu, Curtea Constituţională a României, p. 15; Mihai Constantinescu, Marius 
Amzulescu, Drept contencios constituional, p. 119. 
24 See Ion Deleanu, Instituţii şi proceduri constituţionale – în dreptul comparat şi în dreptul român, p. 709-710; 
Ioan Muraru, Mihai Constantinescu, Curtea Constituţională a României, p. 15; Mihai Constantinescu, Marius 
Amzulescu, Drept contencios constituţional, p. 119. 
25  See  Tudor  Drăganu,  Drept  constituţional  şi  instituţii  politice  –  tratat  elementar,  volume  I,  Lumina  Lex 
Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 312. Ioan Muraru, Mihai Constantinescu, op.cit., p. 15. 
26 http://www.ccr.ro/statistics/pdf/ro/sin11_2011.pdf (11.12.2011). 
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concerns the wealth of a person that the illicit acquisition to be proven. ... The proposal of 
revision aims for the reversal of the burden of proof regarding the legal feature of the 
property, providing that the fortune whose legal acquirement cannot be proved shall be 
confiscated.  Consequently,  it  follows  that  the  wealth  of  a  person  is  presumed  to  be 
acquired illegally, until the proof of the contrary is made by its titular.... According to 
Article 148 paragraph 2 of the Constitution no revision can be made if it results in the 
suppression of guarantee regarding a constitutional right.” 
By Decision no. 82 of 27 April 2000 regarding the constitutionality of the initiative 
for revision of the provisions of Article 41 paragraph 2 the first part of the Constitution 
initiated by 689.237 citizens, the Constitutional Court declared it unconstitutional on the 
grounds that it cannot hold the fulfillment of conditions of formal nature.  
The  legislative  initiative  revising  the  Article  41  paragraph  2,  first  part,  of  the 
Constitution of 1991, according to which: “Private property shall be equally protected by 
the law, irrespective of its owner”, the text proposed by the initiators of the revision will 
be as follows: "Private property  shall be equally guaranteed by law irrespective of its 
owner”. According to the Court’s reasoning, the documentation attached to the complaint, 
it  follows  that  the  gathering  of  signatures  to  support  the  initiative  of  revising  the 
Constitution  was  made before the entry into force of  Law  nr.189/1999 (regarding the 
exercise  of  legislative  initiative  by  citizens).  Therefore,  these  operations  could  not  be 
subject to verification by reference to the conditions set by the law, whereas in this way 
the provisions of Article 15 paragraph 2 from the Constitution of 1991 would be violated, 
according to which: “The law shall only act for the future, except for the more favorable 
criminal or administrative law”. Under these circumstances, the Constitutional Court ruled 
that it could not verify the fulfilling of the conditions of form as they are required (the 
authenticity of signatures on the list if signatories had the quality of citizens entitled to 
vote  and  whether  they  were  residing  in  counties  where  they  have  signed  lists)  and 
therefore cannot hold the “(non) performance of”
28 formal conditions provided by Article 
146 of the Constitution, concerning the necessary minimum number of supporters and 
their dispersion in the counties and in the municipality of Bucharest. 
 The Constitutional Court Decision no. 148 of 16 April 2003
29 notified itself ex 
officio regarding the initiative of revising the Romanian Constitution of 1991, initiated by 
233 deputies and 93 senators.  
The Court, through its decision, considered the vast majority of the constitutional 
proposals  (for  example ,  a  proposal  prohibiting  forced  passage  of  goods  in  public 
ownership based on ethnic, religious, political considerations of the holders, considered a 
solid guarantee of the right to property; establishing competence of the two Chambers of 
Parliament  in  jo int  and  separate  meetings),  some  were  considered  unconstitutional 
(overturning the burden of proof regarding the legal feature of the property; the decisions 
of the Superior Council of Magistracy cannot  be challenged in court, violati ng the free 
                                                 
28 It was seen as a mistake of typing the text, it had to appear as „to comply with” otherwise there would be a 
contradiction between the enacting terms and the Decision’s reasons - see Ion Deleanu, Instituţii şi proceduri 
constituţionale – în dreptul comparat şi în dreptul român, p. 708. 
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access to justice) and concerning specific issues, the Court made specific proposals or 
comments  (eg  regarding  the  Country’s  Supreme  Defence  Council,  related  to  the 
extradition of Romanian citizens; the Court’s acquisition of other tasks by organic law; 
the term of maximum 45 days, set for Government and Parliament’s agreement upon the 
unconstitutional provisions, should not be applied in the case of exercising the attribution 
set  by  the  Article    letter  a;  the  right  of  the  Ombudsman  to  directly  address  the 
Constitutional Court with a plea of unconstitutionality; the tie  breaker between public and 
private education, on the one hand and the secular and religious, on the other hand; the 
specialization of the Ombudsman’s deputies is under the jurisdiction of organic law and 
not  a  under  constitutional  provision;  reinvestment  of  the  former  judges  of  the 
Constitutional  Court  that  had  not  exercised  the  entire  mandate  of  nine  years;  the 
replacement  of  the  term  “public  institution”  with  “public  authorities”),  proposals  and 
comments that the Parliament has appropriated only in part. Later, after the adoption of 
the Law of revising the Constitution no. 429/2003, the Constitutional Court has received 
two  pleas  of  unconstitutionality  which  were  resolved  by  Decision  no.  356  of  23 
September  2003
30  and Decision no. 285 of 15 October 2003
31. In both the above -
mentioned decisions, the Constitutional Court  pronounced itself incompetent to rule  on 
the two complaints invoking the provisions of the Constitution and the Law no. 47/1992 at 
the time, respectively before revision and before the amendment of Law no. 47/1992 in 
2004. 
By Decision no. 6 of  4 July, 2007 regarding the citizens’ legislative initiative for 
the revision of the Constitution
32, in what concerns the Article 48, the Court held th at it 
does not satisfy the requirements of  Article 150 of the Constitution, because it  does not 
meet the cumulative condition of territorial dispersion in counties and in Bucharest (more 
than 20 counties have not sent at least 20,000 signatures). 
In the most recent occasion, the Constitutional Court ruled  upon the initiative to 
revise the Constitution of Romania in the Decision no. 799 of 17 June, 2011
33. Is the first 
time,  when  the  initiative  to  revi se  the  Constitution  initiated  by  the  head  of  state,  
respectively  the  President  of  Romania  on  the  proposal  of  the  Government.  The 
amendments taken into consideration  by the initiator address three main objectives: 
“switching to a unicameral parliament; the need for adaptations and adjustments of the 
Constitution  to  the  realities  of  the  contemporary  society,  clarifying  institutional  and 
regulatory solutions to determine the cooperation of public authorities and eliminate gaps 
that might arise between them”
34. Most of the proposals for amendments aim at the re-
correlation of the Romanian constitutional system reported by a unicameral Parliament. 
The  Constitutional  Court  considered  as  much  the  aspects  of  extrinsic 
constitutionality  (compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Article  150  paragraph  1  and 
Article 152 paragraph 3 corroborated with Article 63 paragraph 4 of the Constitution) as 
                                                 
30 Published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 689 of 30 September 2003.  
31 Published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 728 of 17 October 2003.  
32 Published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 540 of 8 August 2007. 
33 Published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 440 of 23 June 2011. 
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those relating to the intrinsic constitutionality (in relation to Article 153 paragraph 1 and 2 
of the Constitution). 
As in the past, the Constitutional Court considered certain provisions constitutional 
in the draft of the revision (a new area of regulation by organic law, namely that of the 
liability of judges and prosecutors; the procedure for adopting the laws related to the 
possible  unicameral  structure  of  the  Parliament;  consulting  the  President  of  Romania 
before the proposed dismissal or appointment of the Government members by the Prime 
Minister,  express  regulation  of  the  extinctive  effect  of  the  negative  decision  of  the 
Constitutional Court regarding the procedure for suspension of the President; quantitative 
limitation of the possibility of Government to engage liability towards the Parliament, 
constitutional consecration of the principle of budgetary balance), some were considered 
unconstitutional  (for  example,  the  proposal  on  the  elimination  of  the  presumption 
regarding legal feature of the wealth (because it has the effect of suppressing a guarantee 
of the property ownership, thus violating the limits laid down in Article 152 paragraph (2) 
of the revised Constitution); proposal for elimination the inviolability of the MP (have the 
effect  of  suppressing  a  fundamental  right  of  the  person  who  occupies  a  high  public 
position,  violating  the  limits  set  by  the  Article  152  paragraph  (2)  of  the  revised 
Constitution); restricting the duties of Interim President regarding the appointment of the 
candidate for the prime minister position and implicitly forming a Government; giving up 
the  constitutional  guarantee  established  in  Article  109  paragraph  (2)  regarding  the 
initiation of prosecution against Government members; a new exemption from the judicial 
control  namely  the  administrative  provisions  relating  to  certain  fiscal  and  budgetary 
policies of the Government (it has the effect of suppressing free access to justice, violating 
the limits of revision under Article 152 paragraph (2) of the Constitution); the increase in 
number  of  the  members  of  civil  society  representatives  and  changing  proportion  of 
representation in the Superior Council of Magistracy (an effect would be the violation of 
judicial  independence,  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  Article  152  paragraph  (1)  of  the 
Constitution) and moreover a series of observations or recommendations were made and 
certain reservations were expressed about the appropriateness of proposals (eg  making 
rules constitutional, rules already contained in an organic law - the procedure of initiating 
the referendum by the President on matters of national interest; limiting the object on 
which the Government may assume responsibility in a program; a statement of general 
policy or a single bill to regulate social relations that concerns one area; the obligation of 
the Government to transmit to the European Union the project of the state budget and that 
of  the  social  security  of  the  state,  after  informing  the  Parliament  -  it  is  considered 
redundant and excessive, the re-evaluation the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction provided 
in Article 146 letter e; the recommendation of being repealed Article 146 letter 1of the 
Constitution according to which “fulfills other functions provided by the organic law of 
the Court”, the Court proposes the introduction of new powers of the Constitutional Court 
respectively the one of pronouncing, ex officio, upon the constitutionality of decisions 
















Beyond the controversy related to the legal nature of the constitutional judicial 
authority and independence from other state authorities, we believe that the inclusion in 
the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court of the attribution to verify the compliance to 
the constitutional conditions, in its efforts of amending the fundamental law, contributes 
to the strengthening role as guarantor for the of supremacy the Constitution. 
The fact that such a control, as the one regulated by the Article 146 letter a the 
second part, of the Constitution is exercised ex officio and features an obligation of the 
Constitutional Court, confers consistency in this matter and in the same time it features 
also a guarantee towards any attempt of inappropriate amendment of the Constitution.  
An  aspect  that  contributes  to  the  solution  of  the  Court  that  declared  the 
constitutionality/unconstitutionality of certain provisions regarding the constitutional bill 
related to the “hard core” of the Constitution or on matters of extrinsic unconstitutionality 
has a generally obligatory feature.  
On  the  other  hand,  it  should  be  noted  that  although  the  Constitutional  Court 
expresses - as it did whenever it had the opportunity - the point of view or makes a series 
of recommendations on the revising provisions of the bill, they are no longer binding. 
Although the Constitutional Court’s role in the revision of the fundamental law is 
undisputed, there’s still only one stage left in the development of this procedure, followed 
by  the  debate  and  voting  procedure  of  revision  by  the  Romanian  Parliament  (in  the 
position of a Derivative Constituent Assembly) and then national referendum stage (the 
decisive stage as the “last word” must belong to the people and its volition). 
 
 
 
 
 
 